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Incentive effects, monitoring mechanisms and the market for corporate 
control: an analysis of the factors affecting public to private transactions in 
the UK 
Abstract 
The paper investigates the factors that influence the decision to change the 
status of a publicly quoted company to that of a private company. We find that 
firms that go private are more likely to have higher CEO ownership and higher 
institutional ownership. In relation to their board structures, firms going private 
tend to have more duality but there is no statistical difference in the proportion of 
non-executive directors. They do not show signs of having excess free cash 
flows but there is some evidence of lower growth opportunities. We do not find 
that firms going private experience a greater threat of hostile acquisition. The 
results are therefore consistent with incentive and monitoring explanations of 
going private. Calculation of the probability of going private shows that incentive 
effects are stronger than the monitoring effects. 
 
Keywords: public to private transactions: incentives: monitoring: market 
for corporate control 
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Incentive effects, monitoring mechanisms and the market for corporate 
control: an analysis of the factors affecting public to private transactions in 
the UK 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The literature on take-overs tends to treat them as being either homogeneous, 
Palepu (1986) or it distinguishes between hostile and friendly take-overs, Morck 
et al (1988) and Shivdasani (1993). However, there is another type of take-over 
that has become more common in the US and UK in recent years, the public-to-
private transaction (PTP). This occurs when the equity of a publicly quoted 
company is purchased, the company goes private and is therefore no longer 
quoted on the stock market, Frankfurter and Gunay (1992). As Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) note, a number of terms tend to be used interchangeably to describe the 
change in status from public-to-private company, although neither covers all 
PTPs. They identify the two most commonly used terms as “leveraged buyouts”, 
because the PTP transactions are often heavily financed by debt, and 
“management buyouts” because the bidding party often includes the existing 
management team. This study analyses the governance characteristics of UK 
PTPs and compares them with the characteristics of companies that remained 
public.  
 
The paper makes a number of contributions to the corporate governance 
literature. First, it investigates the extent of PTP activity in the UK. Throughout 
the 1990s, the UK experienced an increase in the incidence of friendly 
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acquisitions to such an extent that hostile acquisitions only make up about 2% of 
the acquisition activity for quoted companies in the UK (Weir and Laing 2002). As 
shown in Table 2, public-to-private transactions constitute an increasing 
percentage of quoted take-overs in the UK, around a quarter in recent years. 
Further, during the years under study, 1998-2000, firms going private generated 
sales worth £16.8 billion and so it is important to address the factors that may 
explain this type of acquisition activity.  
 
Second, the paper analyses the role played by internal monitoring mechanisms 
in the decision to go private.  Board structure characteristics of 95 UK public-to-
private targets are compared with those of a matched sample of companies that 
remained publicly quoted. This is an important area of investigation given recent 
concerns about internal governance mechanisms of listed companies that reports 
such as Cadbury (1992) and Hampel (1998) in the UK, as well as others, such as 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US, have sought to address. The impact of 
external monitoring by institutions is also investigated.  
 
Third, we will also investigate how far incentive effects, in the form of share 
ownership, drive the decision to go private. We are unaware of any UK study that 
has investigated either of these two issues in relation to public to private 
changes. Fourth, we investigate the extent to which incentives and monitoring 
effects affect the probability of going private by presenting results on the 
probability of going private for different ownership structures.  
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Fifth, the paper will evaluate the pressures imposed by the market for corporate 
control. A number of studies have identified this as significant factor, Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989), Singh (1990) and Halpern et al (1999). However, it is unclear 
how far they differentiate between hostile and non-hostile take-over interest as 
expressed in the take-over speculation reported in the financial press. The 
analysis is developed to show that refining the measurement of take-over 
speculation such that only hostile speculation is included, rather than any 
reported speculation, can have significant effects on the results. 
 
These will allow us to test a number of agency-related hypotheses in relation to 
the going private decision. First, the extent to which going private is driven by 
incentive effects; second, the importance of monitoring effects; and third, how far 
PTP decisions are driven by the fear of hostile take-over and the presence of 
ineffective monitoring mechanisms. 
 
Our results show that significant differences exist between the PTPs and the 
control sample. Firms going private have higher CEO shareholdings, higher 
institutional shareholdings and are more likely to have the same person acting as 
CEO and chairman. However, no evidence is found of a difference in non-
executive director representation and neither do we find any evidence of excess 
free cash flow. We also find that firms going private are not subject to a greater 
threat of hostile take-over than firms that remain public. The results therefore 
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provide support for the incentive and monitoring explanations for undertaking a 
PTP.  
 
In a development of the analysis we tested a number of variables, including 
accounting performance. We find no evidence that firms going private had poorer 
accounting performance than firms remaining public. We also analysed tax 
advantages, which appear to influence the PTP decision in the US. However, we 
find that there is little similarity in the influences on the decision to go private in 
the US and UK. This may be explained by the tax advantages of financing firms 
through debt rather than equity applying more to the US than the UK, Dicker 
(1990).  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Agency costs are incurred by shareholders, or principals, as a result of the 
separation of ownership and control, Jensen and Meckling (1976). Information 
asymmetry means that managers are able to pursue objectives such as 
corporate size rather than maximising shareholder wealth. A number of corporate 
governance mechanisms may be used to reduce the extent of the agency costs 
incurred by the principals. There are two main categories of governance 
mechanism, internal and external. Internal mechanisms can be split into 
monitoring and incentive related. Monitoring mechanisms refer to board 
structures, Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen, (1983), Cadbury (1992) and 
Greenbury (1995), external shareholdings, Shivdasani (1993), and debt, Jensen 
(1986b). The key incentive mechanism is internal shareholdings, Jensen and 
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Meckling (1976). The main external corporate governance mechanism is the 
market for corporate control, Manne (1965) and Jensen (1986b), which acts as 
the mechanism of last resort if the internal mechanisms fail. 
 
The issue then becomes one of explaining how PTPs reduce agency costs.1 The 
literature on public-to-private transactions can be split into a number of strands.  
The first deals with free cash flow. It argues that pre-PTP, agency costs are 
incurred because free cash flows are spent on projects that do not earn the 
required positive net present value, Jensen (1986b). These firms will exhibit low 
growth opportunities and large free cash flows. The free cash flows are used to 
achieve managerial objectives such as increased size and greater peer group 
standing rather than shareholder wealth maximisation. The ability to do this 
implies ineffective internal corporate governance mechanisms and management 
would only consider a move away from this situation if faced with an increased 
threat of hostile take-over. There is evidence that in the UK hostile take-overs 
result in a significant increase in the turnover of senior management post-
acquisition, Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Franks and Mayer (1996) and Dayha 
and Powell (1999). It is therefore in the interests of the incumbent management 
to take a company private and experience increased monitoring rather than risk 
losing their jobs. Job loss after a hostile take-over would damage their reputation 
and reduce their value on the executive labour market.  
 
 8
US studies of the role of free cash flow in the decision to go private have 
produced mixed results. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Singh (1990) lend support 
to the free cash flow hypothesis by reporting that firms going private have greater 
free cash flow than firms remaining public. In addition, they found that PTPs 
exhibited lower sales growth, indicating poorer growth prospects, further 
supporting Jensen (1986b). However, Kieschnick (1998) reworked Lehn and 
Poulsen’s sample using a weighted logistic regression and found free cash flow 
and sales growth to be insignificant. In addition, Opler and Titman (1993) also 
find no evidence that, individually, either free cash flow or Tobin’s Q, influence 
the decision to go private. However, they do find that leveraged buyouts are 
more likely to exhibit the combined characteristics of low Q and high cash flow 
than firms remaining public. Further, Halpern et al (1999) also find no evidence to 
support the free cash flow hypothesis. Thus there is limited evidence that US 
PTPs exhibit excess free cash flow and poor growth prospects which suggests 
that going private is not being driven by the need to return free cash to the 
shareholders. The role of free cash flow in UK PTPs has not been investigated, 
something undertaken in this paper. 
 
In relation to the second strand, there is evidence that shareholders of PTP firms 
make significant wealth gains. DeAngelo et al (1984) find significant positive 
returns on the announcement of a PTP and significant negative returns when it 
was announced that the PTP proposal had been withdrawn. Torabzadeh and 
Bertin (1987) find that significant abnormal returns accrue to the shareholders of 
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PTP targets if financed by debt. Frankfurter and Gunay (1992) find that insider 
and outsider shareholders gain as a result of PTPs. In addition, Smith (1990) 
reported that there were significant improvements in post-buyout operating 
performance whereas failed MBO attempts did not produce any subsequent 
performance improvement. Thus there is strong evidence that PTPs generate 
gains to insider, and outsider, shareholders indicating that there are strong 
incentive effects in the decision to go private. This would also be consistent with 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) who argue that increased shareholdings help to 
align shareholder and director interests.  
 
The third strand of previous studies deals with the market for corporate control, 
which is based on the premise that take-over bids are disciplinary and therefore 
hostile, Morck et al (1988). So if companies that went private had been the 
subject of take-over speculation whilst still publicly quoted, this implies ineffective 
internal governance mechanisms. The market for corporate control may therefore 
be regarded as a substitute for weak internal governance, Kini et al (1995). A 
number of studies, Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Singh (1990) and Halpern et al 
(1999), found that companies that went private were more likely to experience 
take-over speculation than firms that did not. However, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) 
combine competing bids with press take-over speculation and Halpern et al 
(1999) include any bids and rumours of interest. It therefore appears that these 
take-over speculation measures refer to general speculation about the possibility 
of the companies being taken-over. Some of the speculation may have been 
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hostile and some not. Therefore we need a better understanding of the role of 
take-over speculation and rumour and its part in the decision to go private. 
 
One aspect of the agency problem that has received little attention are the links 
between board composition, ownership structures and the PTP decision.2 In 
terms of ownership, a US study by Maupin et al (1984) found that the 
concentration of ownership amongst managers and directors was significantly 
higher in PTPs relative to firms that remain listed. In relation to of the internal 
corporate governance mechanisms of quoted companies, there has been an 
increasing international awareness of their role and importance. In the US the 
most recent is the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002. In the UK, number of reports have 
specifically addressed the issue, Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel 
(1998), and have proposed that publicly quoted companies should adopt a Code 
of Best Practice, a proposal supported by the London Stock Exchange.3 Since 
June 1993, there has been a requirement that quoted companies include in their 
annual reports a statement explaining the extent to which they have adopted the 
internal governance mechanisms recommended in the Code.  
 
The Code identifies a number of specific governance characteristics that are 
associated with good governance. The main board structure recommendations 
are that there should be a significant representation of non-executive (outside) 
directors and that the posts of CEO and chairman should be split. A significant 
representation is taken to be at least three non-executive directors. It is believed 
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that this is the minimum number required for non-executive directors’ views to 
carry weight at board meetings. The reason for separating the posts of CEO and 
chairman is, according to Cadbury, to prevent one person exercising too much 
power on board decisions. 
 
The mechanisms identified in the Code would therefore be expected to mitigate 
the agency problems associated with weak internal governance. Firms that did 
not exhibit these structures are likely to be poor performers and be subject to 
hostile take-over threat. If the market for corporate control operates as 
hypothesised, ineffective corporate governance mechanisms should result in 
successful hostile bids being made, Fama (1980). For example, using US data, 
Morck et al (1988) and Shivdasani (1993) find governance differences between 
hostile targets and non-targets. In the UK, studies by Weir (1997) and O’Sullivan 
and Wong (1999) also found governance differences. The UK evidence showed 
that hostile targets were more likely to have fewer non-executive directors, more 
likely to have duality and have lower board shareholdings. These findings lend 
support for the governance structures recommended in the Code of Best 
Practice. Cadbury therefore provides a suitable framework against which to 
analyse the extent to which firms going private exhibit good or bad internal 
governance mechanisms. 
 
The above discussion allows us to propose a number of hypotheses, based on 
the agency model, to explain the likelihood of a firm going private. The first 
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hypothesis concerns the perceived threat from the market for corporate control. 
Consistent with this we would expect firms going private to have low managerial 
shareholdings, low external shareholdings, duality and low non-executive director 
representation. These characteristics would enable firms to generate large 
amounts of free cash flow and, as Jensen (1986a) argues, firms with substantial 
free cash flow and poor growth prospects are more likely to go private. The key 
motivation behind returning the free cash to the shareholders is to pre-empt a 
control threat such as a hostile take-over. In such a situation, the existence of 
excess free cash and poor growth prospects implies ineffective monitoring and 
incentive mechanisms and is consistent with the conditions present for the 
operation of the market for corporate control. In addition to the above, we would 
also expect that these companies would be subject to greater take-over threat 
than firms that remain public as other management teams move to bid for them. 
 
Second, the financial incentive hypothesis argues that there are financial gains to 
be made by going private. In particular, taking a company private would yield 
substantial financial gains to the executive directors, particularly as they have 
been found to increase their shareholding post-PTP. For example, Frankfurter 
and Gunay (1992) report that insider shareholdings increase by an average of 
58% post management buy-out. The higher the shareholding therefore, the 
greater the financial gain. We would therefore expect the probability of going 
private would be positively linked to executive director shareholdings. We would 
also expect the incentive effect to be present if the directors believed that the 
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market was undervaluing the company. Thus the incentive hypothesis would also 
be consistent with a negative relationship between the Q ratio and the probability 
of going private.  
 
Third, the effective monitoring hypothesis argues that the better the monitoring, 
the more likely that a public-to-private offer will be accepted, Bae et al (2000). An 
independent board that pursues shareholders’ interests is indicative of effective 
internal monitoring. Thus boards with a greater proportion of non-executive 
directors will be more effective monitors. Similarly, boards that separate the posts 
of chief executive officer and chairman will be better able to influence decisions. 
Therefore, duality is less likely to be present in firms going private. More effective 
external monitoring will occur as institutional shareholdings increase and the 
free-rider problem is overcome. A summary of the expected relationships for 
each of the hypotheses is given in table 1.  
INSERT TABLE1 
3. SAMPLE and DATA 
The sample consists of all public-to-private transactions that took place in the UK 
during 1998-2000 for which full data were available. PTPs are defined as taking 
place when a quoted stockmarket company is delisted as a result of a formal 
take-over by a financial institution such as a venture capitalist or LBO fund, by 
the executive directors or by another individual blockholder. We identified 116 
PTPs during 1998-2000. After removing those involving financial firms and those 
with missing data, the final sample consists of 95 PTPs. The sample excludes 
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financial services companies because they are subject to the external scrutiny of 
bodies like the Financial Services Authority. To be included, three years of pre-
PTP financial data and complete governance information at the last year-end 
before the PTP took place is required. All data refer to the last year-end position 
before the PTP occurred. 
 
A control sample was also constructed which consisted of a matched sample of 
95 non-financial companies that had remained quoted on the London Stock 
Exchange during the period 1998-2000. The matching process was done by size 
and industry, (North 2001). Size was measured by sales and industry by the 
second level Financial Times Industrial Classification. The methodology used, 
matching by sample size, is known as choice-based sampling and classifies the 
population into groups based on outcomes, (Cosslet 1981). The outcome in this 
case being whether or not a company had gone private. Choice-based sampling 
may be appropriate where random sampling would give a small number of cases 
falling into a particular category, (Amemiya 1985). Relatively few firms, only 
around 2.05% of non-financial firms, changed their status from public to private 
so that, unless a randomly drawn sample was very large, random sampling 
would yield few companies making the change. This would create cost 
implications in relation to sample collection. Logistic regression is used in the 
analysis and Maddala (1991) argues that any bias present in choice based 
sampling will appear only in the constant of the regression. 
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Information on PTP transactions was taken from four sources. First, Acquisitions 
Monthly, second, the Centre for Management Buyout Quarterly Review 
(CBMOR), third, the Financial Times and fourth, Extel Company News. 
Acquisitions Monthly is a corporate finance publication that provides data on 
major corporate deals such as take-overs, divestments, demergers and 
management buy-outs.  The CMBOR is published by the Centre for Management 
Buyout Research at Nottingham University Business School and reports data on 
UK management buyouts. The CMBOR database effectively represents the 
population of management buyouts in the UK. Its data are primarily obtained 
from twice yearly surveys of corporate advisors, venture capital providers active 
in management buyouts. These surveys achieve an almost 100 per cent 
response rate. Financial data were taken from Extel Company Analysis, which 
provides accounting and stock market data taken directly from company annual 
reports and from the stockmarket. Corporate governance information was taken 
from the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register. This source contains information 
on board structures, director tenure, director biographies, director shareholdings 
and externally held shareholdings in excess of 3%. Data on take-over 
speculation, threats and rumours were taken from FT Intelligence, an online 
database that provides full text newspaper reports. 
The variables used in the analysis are defined as follows: 
PTP - is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a company had successfully 
undertaken a public to private transaction and 0 if it had remained public. 
PNX - is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
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PINDNX - is the percentage of independent directors on the board. Directors are 
classified as independent if they are non-executive directors that have not 
previously been employed previously either as an executive director of the 
company or had been employed as an advisor to the company.  
DUALITY - is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the same person holds 
the posts of CEO and chairman, and zero if the posts are held by different 
people. 
CEOsh - is the percentage of ordinary shares held by the CEO, or where 
appropriate, the executive chairman. 
XDsh - is the percentage of ordinary shares held by executive directors other 
than the CEO. 
INSTITsh - is the total percentage shareholdings of institutions, where the 
shareholding is in excess of 3%. 
FCF - is a measure of free cash flow. It is defined as operating cash flow minus 
interest, tax and dividends deflated by sales and converted to a percentage. This 
measure is consistent with US studies such as Kieschnick (1998) and Halpern et 
al (1999), 
SPECULATION - is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a company had 
been the subject of take-over speculation in the financial press and zero if it had 
not. This covers the range of press speculation used in Lehn and Poulsen (1989) 
and Halpern et al (1999). The time period during which take-over speculation 
was measured was from one week before the announcement of the PTP to 
eighteen months before the PTP. 
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Q - is the Q ratio and is defined as market capitalisation deflated by total assets. 
It is a proxy for growth prospects, as perceived by the market. 
The binary nature of the dependent variable means that logistic regression is 
appropriate. Logistic regression is based on the cumulative logistic probability 
function and takes the form: 
Li = ln 



 i
i
P
P
1
= Zi  
where Li is the natural log of the odds that a firm will go private, given the 
explanatory variables and Zi is the regression equation specified below in the 
general model:  
iiiiiiii QNSPECULATIOFCFINSTITshCEOshDUALPNXZ 77543210 6  
 
4. RESULTS 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Table 2 shows that, over the period 1991-1997, public-to-private transactions 
accounted for an average of 4.75% of total acquisition activity. During the period 
under study, 1998-2000, there was a sharp increase on the importance of public-
to-private transactions in the UK with the average figure increasing to 23.7%.  
 
There has been no change in the definition of what constitutes a PTP. Evidence 
from detailed interviews with private equity financiers of buy-outs suggests that 
this step change arose through the coming together of a number of demand and 
supply factors, Wright et al (1999) and Burrows and Wright (2002). The period 
from 1995 saw substantial increases in the amount of equity funds raised to 
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finance buy-outs. This in turn prompted increased competition between private 
equity firms for deals. In addition, corporate divestors, in an environment where 
corporate governance was gaining higher prominence, were also increasingly 
looking to auction divisions they no longer wanted to the highest bidder, whereas 
previously they may have given management preference. By bidding up the entry 
price, these auctions thus introduced a winner’s curse-type problem as 
successful bidders had to undertake greater actions to generate the returns 
looked for by their limited partner investors. These factors encouraged private 
equity firms to seek fresh ways of investing funds in deals where there was likely 
to be less competition. In addition, PTPs are seen as relatively low risk compared 
to investment in start-ups or in high technology, especially for funds with 
generalist, later investment stage skills, Lockett, Murray and Wright (2002). 
 
Consolidation amongst fund management firms has resulted in funds getting 
larger and consequently they have ignored smaller quoted companies because 
of the lack of liquidity in the sector. Many companies with a market capitalisation 
of less than £20 million are not researched by sell side investment analysts, 
Treasury (1998) and Golding (2001). The underperformance of the smaller 
quoted firm index and the low valuation of the smaller quoted company sector 
relative to the stockmarket have also contributed to the growth in PTPs. 
Institutional investors were increasingly finding that their holdings in smaller listed 
companies with few growth prospects were illiquid with market makers quoting 
large spreads on the shares and few analysts interested in this part of the 
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market. This problem was exacerbated by the development of the dot-com boom 
as investors shifted their interest away from traditional sectors. Traditionally 
conglomerates like Hanson and BTR would have acquired poorly performing 
and/or undervalued small quoted companies but this option has declined as 
conglomerates themselves have fallen out of favour, particularly since the mid 
1990s. As a result, institutional investors became more willing to sell to 
management buy-outs where previously, in the light of opportunistic 
management-led deals in the 1980s, they may have been more sceptical. At the 
same time, management in these firms, facing difficulties in raising funds to take 
advantage of perceived investment opportunities, became disillusioned with a 
stock market listing. Debt providers were also persuaded to become more willing 
to commit to lending to management buy-out cases of this kind thus helping 
private equity bidders to meet the certain funds requirements of the Take-over 
Code, even though the banks may not have obtained full security for several 
months [Sterling and Wright (1990)]. 
 
In addition, analysis of the press coverage reported in the sources used to gather 
information on PTPs identifies concerns about market valuation as the most 
commonly quoted reason for taking a company private, with 63% of firms giving it 
as a reason. This is consistent with the theoretical argument that institutional 
shareholders lack interest in these companies because of their size.4 
Consequently, low market valuation could be a problem. These reports lend 
some initial support for the incentive and monitoring hypotheses. Low valuation 
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makes it harder to raise equity on the stock market, something that will further 
adversely affect future prospects. The Report on Smaller Quoted Companies, 
Treasury (1998), was an attempt to address the problems faced by smaller 
quoted companies and their apparent low market valuation. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
Table 3 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of both samples as well 
as the univariate analysis. The insignificant difference in the sales figures shows 
that the matching process was accurate. In terms of board structure, the average 
number of non-executive directors (NNX) of the public to private sample is 2.74 
with the average number of independent directors (NINDX) being 2.33. Both are 
below the minimum of three non-executive directors recommended in the Code 
of Best Practice. The numbers of non-executive and independent non-executive, 
directors are significantly lower for PTPs. PTPs also have lower percentages of 
non-executive and independent non-executive directors, but the differences are 
not significant. The other board structure variable, duality, shows that PTPs have 
a significantly greater proportion of firms exhibiting this characteristic than do 
firms that remain public.  
 
Table 3 also shows that PTPs have higher CEO and institutional shareholdings 
than companies remaining public. The difference for CEO shareholdings is 
significant at 1% and for institutional shareholdings at 10%. However, there is no 
difference between the shareholdings of the non-CEO executive directors 
suggesting that any incentive effects are being driven by CEO shareholdings 
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rather than by other executive director shareholdings. PTPs also have 
significantly lower Q ratios. There is no evidence that the extent of free cash flow 
differs between the two types of firms. However, firms going private experienced 
significantly more take-over speculation than the non-acquired firms.  
INSERT Table 4 
The logistic multivariate results are presented in Table 4. Two models are 
presented because of the high correlation between the percentage of non-
executive directors and the percentage of independent non-executive directors 
(the Pearson correlation is 0.79). In addition, CEO shareholdings is replaced by 
other executive director shareholdings in an attempt to evaluate the incentive 
effects of their shareholdings. Models 1 and 2 show that firms going private are 
more likely to have higher CEO shareholdings and higher institutional 
shareholdings. Their Q ratios however are not different. The non-executive 
director measures are not significantly different but duality is significantly more 
common in firms going private. Thus the impact of internal board structures on 
the probability of going private is unclear, particularly given that duality is one of 
the governance mechanisms that the Code of Best Practice identifies as being 
best avoided. We also find no evidence that free cash flow differences explain 
the probability of going private, a conclusion that is consistent with most US 
evidence.  
 
Table 4 also shows that, for all four models, firms going private are more likely to 
experience take-over speculation than firms remaining public, (the role of the 
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market for corporate control is examined further below). Models 3 and 4 provide 
limited evidence that there are incentive effects operating for the executive 
directors, other than the CEO. Model 4 also suggests that the boards of PTPs 
are less independent than firms that remain public. However, the insignificance 
on the Q ratio variable shows that the market does not regard them as having 
poorer growth opportunities. The multivariate results therefore offer support for 
the incentive and monitoring hypotheses with only the duality result providing 
support for the threat from the market for corporate control hypothesis.5  
INSERT Table 5 
As discussed earlier, a number of US studies have incorporated a ‘footsteps’, or 
take-over speculation variable, based on press reports of take-over interest, Lehn 
and Poulsen (1989), Kieschnick (1998) and Halpern et al (1999). Such interest 
has been taken to be hostile. As Table 5 shows, some 60% of firms that went 
private experienced bid speculation with only 14% of non-PTPs, with the 
difference being statistically significant. This implies that, as shown in Table 4, 
the incumbent management is under strong pressure from the market for 
corporate control.  
 
However, there are a number of potential problems with the use of reported take-
over speculation. First, the source of the rumour is not usually specified and 
second, the reports merely make reference to the fact that take-over speculation 
has occurred. Press speculation may refer either to rumours that implicitly relate 
to a potential change of status from public to private or, alternatively, they may 
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refer to the possibility that a rumour relates to a potential hostile bid. The 
speculation variable was therefore refined to clarify the extent to which PTPs 
faced a clear hostile threat. Two new measures were constructed. First, 
THREAT1, took a value of one if a company had been the subject of a bid that 
was reported as hostile, if there were multiple bidders for the company or there 
had been a proxy fight, and zero if not. This filters out the more general rumours 
and reports that relate to the possibility of a PTP happening and leaves only 
press speculation that identifies possible hostile intent or control contests by 
other bidders. It therefore gives a better measure of the pressure from the market 
for corporate control than, for example, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) who include all 
take-over rumours. As Table 5 shows, according to press reports, only 14% of 
PTPs experienced this type of bid, something also experienced by 7.38% of firms 
that remained public. The difference is not statistically significant. 
 
However, even removing competing bids does not provide a complete picture of 
the extent of hostile threat. For example, it is unclear if these competing bids 
occurred after the initial offer made by the incumbent management, that is, after 
news of a move to take the company private had been released to the market. In 
these circumstances, other firms expressing an interest does not strictly mean 
that any counter bid is hostile because the interest has been brought about after 
the target company had been put into play by its management. As a result, the 
expression of interest may be a consequence of the target’s management putting 
the firm on the market rather than being a response to, for example, poor 
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performance. Competing bids may therefore be part of an auction situation, 
Schwert (2000).6 We therefore further refined the speculation variable with 
THREAT2 including only those PTPs that were reported in the press as 
specifically having been the subject of a hostile bid. Table 5 shows that only 
3.15% of PTPs, and 2.10% of firms remaining private experienced such interest, 
according to press coverage. This difference is also statistically insignificant.  
 
Therefore, very few UK PTPs appear to have been undertaken in response to 
pressures from the market for corporate control because most of the speculation 
reported in by the press was not of a hostile nature. The inclusion of certain types 
of press speculation, therefore, has a significant impact on the extent to which 
the market for corporate control plays a part in the decision to go private. The 
results of earlier studies should therefore be treated with some caution. 
INSERT Table 6 
The impact of pressures from the market for corporate control was reassessed 
using these refined speculation definitions. The logistic regressions of Table 4 
were rerun with the THREAT2 variable replacing the broader SPECULATION 
measure of take-over rumour. The results are presented in Table 6. There are a 
number of key changes that suggest that the way in which the market for 
corporate control is measured has important implications for the decision to go 
private.  
 
First, in Table 6, we find that the Q ratio is now negative and significant rather 
than insignificant as reported in Table 4. Thus firms going private are perceived 
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to have poorer growth opportunities than those remaining public. It therefore 
offers some support for the incentive hypothesis because of the perception that 
the market undervalues the companies. It is also consistent with the sentiments 
quoted in the press coverage of the decisions. The second change is that the 
threat of take-over becomes insignificant. Thus including only speculation that is 
consistent with the market for corporate control shows that firms going private did 
not experience greater pressure than did firms remaining private. Regressions 
were also run with THREAT1 but it was also insignificant and its inclusion did not 
affect the significance of any of the other variables. These results show that 
using a broad definition of press speculation can lead to an incorrect 
interpretation of the impact of the threat of take-over on the decision to go 
private. 
 
The results therefore offer little support for the threat from the market for 
corporate control hypothesis because there is no evidence that the companies 
going private were actually under pressure from being acquired by hostile take-
over. The findings are therefore more consistent with the incentive and 
monitoring hypotheses. In relation to the former, we find lower Q and higher CEO 
shareholdings in firms going private. Additional support for the incentive 
hypothesis is provided by the extent of the bid premium received by shareholders 
of firms going private. The premium received averaged 44.9% over the month 
prior to the announcement, a result consistent with DeAngelo et al (1984).7 This 
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also suggests that there is a financial incentive for existing institutional 
shareholders to sell their shares and receive the premium.  
 
In terms of the monitoring hypothesis, we find higher institutional shareholdings 
which suggests better external monitoring. This is consistent with interview 
evidence gathered by the CMBOR that, because of the costs of undertaking 
PTPs, venture capitalists attempt to reduce the risk of bid failure by selecting 
targets where they can persuade major shareholders to commit to the deal, 
(CMBOR 2001). Further, given that PTPs tend to be small, institutional 
shareholders may be more willing to accept offers for small, relatively slow 
growing firms because the transactions costs involved in tracking and overseeing 
these companies may outweigh the benefits, Treasury (1998). This is also in line 
with the views expressed in footnote 4 that those involved in taking companies 
private have the perception that the market undervalues them and makes it 
difficult to fund expansion because institutional investors are uninterested in 
them.  
 
The duality coefficient is contrary to expectations. However, given that the 
median sales of PTPs is £71.47 million, duality may suggest more effective 
internal monitoring. This was recognised in the Hampel Report which, although 
concluding that the posts of CEO and chairman should be separated, stated that 
there should be a degree of flexibility in the consideration of the governance 
characteristics of smaller firms. It also stressed the importance of individual 
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circumstances. Further, Cadbury and Hampel both argued that where the posts 
were combined, shareholders should be given some justification for it. It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that the governance arrangements of the firms in 
the sample had been agreed by the shareholders and that they had their support. 
Duality may therefore be an effective monitoring mechanism in small firms, 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Further analyses were undertaken in an attempt to gauge the extent to which the 
results are robust to different variable definition. First, a number of alternative 
performance measures were also tested. Accounting measures such as profit 
margins, the return on assets and the return on equity were included. All were 
found to be insignificant, which provides evidence that PTPs were not poor 
performers and had no reason to fear that a hostile take-over bid would be 
received. This further calls into question the use of take-over speculation as an 
explanatory variable without investigating the sentiments expressed in the press 
coverage. 
 
Second, a number of US studies have looked at the impact of tax expenditures 
on the decision to go private. Kaplan (1989) found that there were significant tax 
savings associated with MBOs, derived from the increase in debt, and that this 
was an important source of wealth gains.  Kieschnick (1998) shows that the 
ability to reduce tax is linked to the premiums paid to shareholders when going 
private. The potential tax benefits of PTPs are also found in Halpern et al (1999) 
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who report that firms choosing to go private are more likely to have higher tax 
payments than companies remaining public. We measured tax expenditures as 
tax paid as a percentage of sales. The variable was insignificant suggesting that, 
contrary to US evidence, potential tax benefits are not a key determinant in the 
decision to go private in the UK. As noted earlier, differences in the tax regimes 
relating to the treatment of interest on debt between the two countries may help 
explain this finding, Dicker (1990). 
 
Third, given the inconclusive nature of the impact of free cash flow in other 
studies, alternative measures of free cash flow were also tested. These were 
first, free cash flow net of internal capital expenditure deflated by sales and 
second, operating cash flow deflated by sales. Neither measure was found to be 
significant suggesting that excessive free cash flow is not a reason for going 
private, a finding consistent with Opler and Titman (1993) and Kieschnick (1998). 
Fourth, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) had found low sales growth increased the 
probability of going private. However, we found sales growth to be insignificant 
for a number of years pre-PTP, as did Kieschnick (1998). The results presented 
therefore appear to be robust. 
 
6. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
The above results show the importance of incentive and monitoring effects in the 
decision to go private. We analyse this decision further by investigating the 
probability of going private for different levels of CEO and institutional 
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shareholdings. The population of non-financial quoted UK companies is 1634 for 
1998, 1541 for 1999 and 1451 for 2000 (Price Waterhouse Corporate Register). 
This makes a total of 4626 over the three years. The number of PTPs over that 
period was 95, which is (95/4626) = 2.05% of the population. Let P1 be the 
proportion of PTPs that were sampled (100% as defined) and P2 be the 
proportion of PTP firms sampled (in relation to the total number of public quoted 
firms, 2.05%). Then P1=1 and P2=0.0205 and the adjustment to the constant term 
is ln(1)–ln(0.0205) = 3.88. The constant must therefore be reduced by 3.88 to 
overcome sampling bias, Maddala (1991). The probability of going private is then 
calculated by: 
PI = 
iZe1
1  
Inserting the mean values of the variables into the Model 1, Table 4 gives an 
overall probability of going private of 1.98%. (The actual probability for non-
financial firms over the period was 2.05%). 
INSERT TABLE 7  
Table 7 shows the probability of being involved in going private for different levels 
of CEO shareholdings, with other variables measured at their means. It shows 
that for CEO shareholdings up to 30%, the probability remains quite small, less 
than 5.8%. At shareholdings of 70%, the probability of going private, ceteris 
paribus, is 33.70%. The table also shows that, as CEO ownership increases over 
40%, the probability of going private increases sharply with the largest 
incremental change in the probability (10.6 percentage points) being found in the 
range 60% to 70% share ownership. The figures are consistent with strong 
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financial incentive effects at high CEO ownership. For comparison purposes, the 
probability of going private was also calculated for institutional shareholdings and 
it was found that they had a much smaller impact. For example, at 10% 
institutional share ownership, the probability of going private was 1.03% whereas 
at 70% institutional shareholdings, the probability of going private is only 6.81%. 
These results suggest that the decision to go private is being driven by internal 
rather than external mechanisms and that incentive effects appear to be stronger 
than monitoring effects. 
 
The above conclusion was examined further by looking at the interactions 
between monitoring and incentive effects as well as between internal and 
external monitoring. First, if the CEO had a large shareholding and was also the 
chairman, the combination would provide strong incentive and monitoring effects 
to take the company private, particularly if there was a perception that the market 
had a poor view of its growth prospects. Second, the relationship between 
internal and external monitoring was examined by looking at the interaction of 
institutional shareholdings and duality. A positive coefficient would imply that 
internal and external monitoring complemented each other in the decision to go 
public. 
INSERT Table 8 
The multivariate results with the interaction terms are reported in Table 8. The 
CEO shareholdings-duality interaction term is significant in models 8 and 10. This 
suggests that combined, incentive and internal monitoring effects increase the 
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probability of going private. This reinforces the earlier findings. However, as 
shown in models 7 and 9, the combination of internal and external monitoring has 
no effect on the decision to go private. Thus the combination of internal and 
external monitoring does not influence the PTP decision. These results also hold 
if the broader THREAT1 is used instead.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has identified a number of governance mechanisms that differ 
between firms going private and those remaining publicly quoted. The results are 
consistent with incentive and monitoring hypotheses but not with the fear of the 
market for corporate control hypothesis. It may be that, in the context of 
increasing globalisation, these companies are too small to be attractive to a 
corporate buyer and therefore were under less pressure from the risk of take-
over.  
 
We find that firms going private are more likely to have higher CEO 
shareholdings, higher institutional shareholdings, more duality and lower Q 
ratios. However, we find that the presence of non-executive and independent 
directors was statistically insignificant as was the interaction between institutional 
shareholdings and duality. We also find that, adjusting press reports to exclude 
non-hostile rumours, there is no evidence that PTPs experience more pressure 
from the market for corporate control than firms remaining public. It is argued that 
duality may be regarded as a positive internal monitoring mechanism because 
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PTP firms are small. This is supported by the lack of evidence of excess free 
cash flow, the fact that accounting performance is not worse and the lack of 
pressure from the market for corporate control. The results also show that 
different factors drive PTPs in the UK and US. The agency model has therefore 
been shown to offer insights into public to private activity in the UK and that there 
are different characteristics between countries.  
  
The importance of CEO shareholdings is consistent with evidence that the most 
important factor in driving post-buy-out gains is management’s equity stake, not 
high leverage [Denis (1994), Phan and Hill (1995) and Thompson et al (1992)]. 
This suggests that the financial performance of buy-out firms is not simply 
associated with free cash flow issues. Incentives for management may 
encourage them to seek out value maximising opportunities that they may not 
have previously done. However, entrepreneurial managers may also identify 
opportunities for innovation and growth that they were unable to exploit while the 
company remained listed. Their cognitive ability may enable them to identify 
opportunities on the basis of limited and private information but they may find it 
difficult to convince public markets, with monitoring by passive institutional 
investors and a short term focus, of the profitability of these opportunities [Wright 
et al (2000)]. By taking the company private with funding from specialist private 
equity firms who are able to understand the market, these opportunities may be 
realised. These transactions are typically less highly leveraged than traditional 
buy-outs in order to provide the firm with the financial flexibility to exploit growth 
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opportunities. This suggests that an approach focused on reducing the agency 
costs of control may be more appropriate to cases where there is scope to 
enhance efficiency and less so to innovative cases that depend on managers’ 
entrepreneurial mindset and an approach to active investor involvement 
comprising technical and market assistance and not just financial monitoring.   
 
Public to private transactions can be viewed as part of a life-cycle approach to 
corporate governance and finance. Jensen (1989) argued that highly leveraged 
buyouts of listed companies represented the eclipse of the public corporation. In 
contrast, Rappaport (1990) took a shorter-term view, arguing that such buyouts 
would need to go public again to enable equity financiers to achieve their capital 
gains. The systematic evidence clearly shows heterogeneity of the longevity of 
buyouts. Between a fifth and a third return to public ownership within a three year 
period (depending on the country of study, whether equity backed or not and the 
size of the transactions) with a large proportion remaining as buyouts for periods 
well in excess of five years, Kaplan (1991) and Wright et al (1995). 8 
 
PTPs provide an opportunity to take a company private, restructure it and grow it 
so that it may be represented to the stock market, or acquisition market, at a later 
date. The trend to PTPs suggests that the public capital market does not function 
well for smaller firms and that private equity firms may have a role to play in 
funding these cases. The development of PTPs in sectors that do not fit the strict 
Jensen conditions for highly leveraged buy-outs, that is stable cash flows and low 
 34
investment opportunities, suggests that private equity firms may have an 
important role as active investors in the governance and strategic direction of 
firms that the capital markets find difficult to fulfil. In terms of the development of 
the corporate governance debate, our findings add to the view that there may be 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms that are appropriate for different 
kinds of firms and at different points in the firm’s life cycle. At an economy wide 
level, this suggests that the private equity market may be playing an important 
role in enhancing the performance of corporations that the public equity market 
cannot achieve. 
 
The results open up a number of additional directions for further research. First, it 
would be interesting to analyse the relationship between the degree of 
undervaluation, the extent of the premiums paid at the time of the PTP, the 
extent of restructuring activities undertaken during the buyout period and the 
timing and forms of any eventual return to public ownership. Ultimately, such an 
analysis would shed light on claims that there is a market inefficiency that leads 
to firms being mistakenly undervalued or whether private equity firms taking firms 
private possess superior information and skills that enable them to effect 
significant capital gains.  
 
Other areas of further research include first, the analysis of PTP activity in other 
advanced economies. There is evidence elsewhere in Europe of PTP activity, 
notably in France and Sweden, with some PTP transactions also appearing in 
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Germany (CMBOR, 2002). The nascent Japanese buyout market is also 
experiencing a modest flow of PTPs (Wright and Kitamura, 2003). Second, public 
to private transactions make up a considerable proportion of firms that are 
takenover so it would be interesting to see how far there are differences between 
them and other target companies. For example, this might involve comparative 
analysis of performance and sectoral differences. This would allow us to assess 
the extent to which target firms were homogeneous in their characteristics or 
whether there are distinct subgroups within target firms. Third, some firms may 
be too small to be of interest to the financial press so that some hostile interest 
may not be identified from this source. Additional information on the nature of 
market for corporate control pressure would offer further insights into the 
process. Fourth, if problems in obtaining finance from the stock market influence 
the PTP decision, it may be fruitful to examine differences in share liquidity and 
trading volumes as indicators of the ability of different types of firm to obtain 
funds from this source. 
 
NOTES 
1. One way in which agency costs could be reduced would be from lower 
information costs as a result of having less disclosure costs and a reduced need 
to comply with various regulatory bodies. For example, the costs of a 
stockmarket listing are estimated to be up to £1 million per annum, even for 
smaller quoted companies. This figure was quoted in the Financial Times, 4th 
March 1999 (Wain Homes to go private in £88 million buyout) and was given by 
the executive chairman of Wain Homes, who stated that the cost of stockmarket 
listing was a significant factor in their decision to go private. 
2. With the exception of Bae et al (2000), no study has addressed the 
relationship between internal governance structures and the PTP decision. Their 
study investigated the LBO-LRC choice, where leveraged recapitalisation (LRC) 
refers to the decision to make a large debt-financed cash payout to existing 
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shareholders. They report that LBOs have higher board shareholdings, have 
fewer independent directors and fewer outside blockholders than LRCs. They 
argue that these characteristics mean that LBO targets are less suitable for the 
stockmarket because they are less open to monitoring.  
3. The most recent, Higgs (2003), looks specifically at the role of non-executive 
directors. 
4. Comments from directors involved in the PTP process that were reported in 
the financial press support this view. For example, the chairman of Wain Homes, 
in the Financial Times, 4 March 1999, ‘We feel unloved and unwanted….There 
has been a lack of investor appeal for small company shares over the last two or 
three years.’ (Wain Homes to go private in £88 million buyout). The chairman of 
Goldsmiths, in the Guardian, 19 March 1999, states ‘In the last two years there 
has been a significant change in attitude towards smaller companies. Investment 
managers are turning their backs on us…… good, solid engineering companies 
and retailers are being grossly undervalued.’ (Goldsmiths turns its back on city 
investors).  
5. Kieschnick (1998) argues that small samples result in bias in the standard 
errors and proposes the use of Manski and Lerman’s (1977) weighted maximum 
likelihood estimator. This was applied to the data and the results were found to 
be identical to the results in Table 4 with one exception - the institutional 
shareholding variable became insignificant. This casts doubt on the monitoring 
hypothesis but has no effect on the incentive hypothesis and provides additional 
evidence that the market for corporate control hypothesis does not explain the 
decision to go private. 
6. Research undertaken by CMBOR has found that auctions are becoming more 
common in PTPs, (CMBOR 2001). 
7. The figure was calculated from data provided in Acquisitions Monthly and is 
the increase in the share price from 28 days before the PTP announcement to 
the day of the announcement. 
8. The CMBOR database shows that PTPs generally have a lower exit rate than 
all buyouts of a comparable size. For example, over the period 1985-1999, and 
using deals with a transaction value in excess of £10 million, which covers most 
PTPs, the figures show that 15.5% of these PTPs had exited by a trade sale, 
8.7% by IPO, 5.8% by secondary buyout and 10.7% had failed. The comparable 
figures for all deals in this size range were 29.8%, 12.4%, 9.2% and 9.4% 
respectively. Over this 15 year period, the exit rate of PTPs with an initial deal 
value of £10 million by vintage year, that is when the deal was completed, has 
exceeded that for all buyouts in only five of the years. It is worth noting that the 
percentage of deals in this value range exited by vintage year in the periods of 
most PTP activity (1988-1990 and 1997-1999) is greater for all deals than for 
PTPs. Thus for 1988-1990, the exit rate for PTPs is 50%, 69.2% and 50%: for all 
deals the figures are 81.5%, 86.6% and 80.6%. For 1997-1999, the figures are: 
PTPs – 28.6%, 33.3% and 21.1% and for all deals 50.6%, 42.3% and 27.3%. 
This would seem to raise questions about the ex post ability of financial investors 
to create value from PTPs. 
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Table 1 Summary of hypotheses and expected signs 
 Fear of the 
Market for 
Corporate 
Control 
Financial 
incentive 
Effective 
monitoring 
(i) Shareholdings    
- CEO - + na 
- institutional - na + 
(ii) Board 
Independence 
   
- non executive 
directors 
- na + 
- duality + na - 
(iii) Others    
- Free cash flow + na na 
- Q ratio - - na 
- Take-over 
interest 
+          na na 
 
+ high values will increase the probability of going private 
- high values will decrease the probability of going private 
na  means that the variable will have no effect on the probability of going private 
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Table 2 Total number of public to private transactions as percentage of total 
merger activity 
 
   
Year Number of PTPs Number of 
Acquisitions 
PTPs a % of 
Acquisitions 
 
1991 6 91 6.6 
1992 4 59 6.7 
1993 1 58 1.7 
1994 3 63 4.8 
1995 3 87 3.4 
1996 4 87 4.6 
1997 7 127 5.5 
1998 27 162 16.7 
1999 46 192 24.0 
2000 43 142 30.3 
 
Average 1998-
2000 
   
 
23.7 
  
Source: Centre for Management Buy-out Research 
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Table 3 Univariate analysis of board structure, ownership and performance 
characteristics of public to private and remaining public firms 
 
 
 
 Public to private sample Matched non-acquired sample 
 
 
 Min Max Mean Median Min  Max Mean Median T test 
 
(i) Board 
 
         
NNX 
 
0 11 2.74 3.00 0 15 3.18 3.00 1.93* 
NINDX 
 
0 11 2.33 3.00 0 14 2.74 2.00 1.71* 
PNX (%) 0 75.00 43.10 
 
42.85 0 88.24 44.74 42.85 0.76 
PINDNX (%) 0 73.33 36.30 
 
37.50 0 82.35 38.06 33.33 0.68 
Duality 0 1 0.29 
 
0 0 1 0.17 0 2.11** 
 
(ii) Shares 
 
         
CEOsh  
(%) 
0 72.50 11.54 
 
3.51 0 73.53 5.97 1.30 3.16*** 
XDsh (%) 0 66.64 7.00 1.73 0 66.69 5.79 0.97 0.76 
INSTITsh (%) 0 74.80 32.98 33.60 0 88.58 27.86 26.27 1.96* 
(iii) Free cash 
 
         
FCF -38.82 41.28 4.33 
 
-3.42 -27.12 28.09 4.56 -0.81 0.19 
Q 0.04 3.38 0.79 
 
0.62 0.17 11.32 1.08 0.85 3.52* 
 
(iv) Others 
 
         
Speculation 0 1 0.60 
 
1 0 1 0.14 0 43.79*** 
Sales (£m) 0.80 2578.57 177.30 71.47 
 
2.27 2456.36 179.27 104.60 0.18 
Market 
capitalisation 
(£m) 
1.08 1112.00 29.95 80.31 2.41 2047.36 33.79 126.36 1.98* 
 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10% 
 
Paired t test used except for DUALITY and SPECULATION which used the chi square test 
 
NNX is the number of non-executive directors. NINDNX is the number of independent non-
executive directors. Directors are classified as independent if they are non-executive directors 
who have not previously been previously employed either as an executive director of the 
company or had been employed as an advisor to the company PNX is the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board. PINDNX is the percentage of independent directors on the 
board. DUALITY is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the same person holds the posts of 
CEO and chairman, and zero if the posts are held by different people. CEOsh is the percentage 
of ordinary shares held by the CEO, or where appropriate, the executive chairman. XDsh - is the 
percentage of ordinary shares held by executive directors other than the CEO. INSTITsh is the 
total percentage shareholdings of institutions, where the shareholding is in excess of 3%. FCF is 
a measure of free cash flow. It is defined as operating cash flow minus interest, tax and dividends 
deflated by sales and converted to a percentage. SPECULATION is a binary variable that takes 
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the value 1 if a company had been the subject of take-over speculation in the financial press and 
zero if it had not. Q is the Q ratio and is defined as market capitalisation deflated by total assets. 
MARKET CAPITALISATION is the market value of the company 
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Table 4 Logistic regression results of the board, ownership and growth 
opportunity characteristics of public to private firms and firms remaining public. 
  
    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Q -0.4289 
(1.57) 
-0.4414 
(1.61) 
-0.2796 
(1.15) 
-0.2890 
(1.17) 
PNX 0.0008 
(0.06) 
 -0.0140 
(1.18) 
 
PINDNX  -0.0058 
(0.53) 
 -0.0173 
(1.65)* 
Duality 1.1059 
(2.57)** 
1.0882 
(2.51)** 
0.8769 
(2.12)** 
0.8788 
(2.14)** 
CEOsh 0.0514 
(3.34)*** 
0.0488 
(3.24)*** 
  
XDsh   0.0267 
(1.62) 
0.0274 
(1.65)* 
INSTITsh 0.0236 
(2.27)** 
0.0241 
(2.30)** 
0.0139 
(1.46) 
0.0155 
(1.60) 
FCF -0.0233 
(1.12) 
-0.0236 
(1.14) 
-0.0069 
(0.33) 
-0.0064 
(0.30) 
Speculation 2.2762 
(5.73)*** 
2.2985 
(5.74)*** 
2.3126 
(5.99)*** 
2.3700 
(6.04)*** 
Constant -1.7646 
(2.14)** 
-1.4906 
(2.25)** 
-0.7120 
(1.02) 
-0.7506 
(1.27) 
2 69.48*** 69.77*** 58.86*** 60.29*** 
 
t values in parentheses 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%: * - significant at 10% 
2 tests the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero. 
 
PNX is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. PINDNX is the percentage of 
independent directors on the board. Directors are classified as independent if they are non-
executive directors who have not previously been previously employed either as an executive 
director of the company or had been employed as an advisor to the company. DUALITY is a 
binary variable that takes the value 1 if the same person holds the posts of CEO and chairman, 
and zero if the posts are held by different people. CEOsh is the percentage of ordinary shares 
held by the CEO, or where appropriate, the executive chairman. XDsh - is the percentage of 
ordinary shares held by executive directors other than the CEO. INSTITsh is the total percentage 
shareholdings of institutions, where the shareholding is in excess of 3%. FCF is a measure of free 
cash flow. It is defined as operating cash flow minus interest, tax and dividends deflated by sales 
and converted to a percentage. SPECULATION is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a 
company had been the subject of take-over speculation in the financial press and zero if it had 
not. Q is the Q ratio and is defined as market capitalisation deflated by total assets.  
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Table 5 Measures of the threat from the market for corporate control 
 
 PTP (%) 
 
Match (%) Chi square 
Speculation 
  
60.00 14.00 43.79*** 
Threat 1 
 
14.70 7.38 2.62 
Threat 2 
 
3.15 2.10 0.65 
 
*** - significant at 1% 
 
SPECULATION is a binary variable that takes the value one if the company had been the subject 
of take-over speculation in the financial press and zero if it had not. THREAT 1 is a binary 
variable that takes the value one if a company had been the subject of a bid that was reported in 
the financial press as hostile, had received multiple bidders or had been in a proxy fight and zero 
in not. THREAT2 is a binary variable that takes the value one if a company had been the subject 
of a hostile bid according to reports in the financial press and zero if it had not. 
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Table 6 Logistic regression results of the board, ownership and growth 
opportunity characteristics of public to private firms and firms remaining public 
with only hostile interest included as a variable 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Q -0.5020 
(2.00)** 
-1.1146 
(1.87)* 
PNX 0.0038 
(0.33) 
 
PINDNX  0.0007 
(0.07) 
Duality 0.8959 
(2.28)** 
0.8731 
(2.25)** 
CEOsh 0.0526 
(3.57)*** 
0.0514 
(3.54)*** 
INSTITsh 0.0324 
(3.41)*** 
0.0324 
(3.40)*** 
FCF -0.0231 
(1.23) 
-0.0234 
(1.24) 
Threat2 0.3267 
(0.32) 
0.3264 
(0.32) 
Constant -1.2775 
(1.76)* 
 
-1.1146 
(1.87)* 
2  30.16*** 30.05*** 
 
t values in parentheses 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10% 
2 tests the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero. 
 
PNX is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. PINDNX is the percentage of 
independent directors on the board. Directors are classified as independent if they are non-
executive directors who have not previously been previously employed either as an executive 
director of the company or had been employed as an advisor to the company. DUALITY is a 
binary variable that takes the value 1 if the same person holds the posts of CEO and chairman, 
and zero if the posts are held by different people. CEOsh is the percentage of ordinary shares 
held by the CEO, or where appropriate, the executive chairman. INSTITsh is the total percentage 
shareholdings of institutions, where the shareholding is in excess of 3%. FCF is a measure of free 
cash flow. It is defined as operating cash flow minus interest, tax and dividends deflated by sales 
and converted to a percentage. THREAT2 is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a company 
had been the subject of hostile take-over speculation in the financial press and zero if it had not. 
Q is the Q ratio and is defined as market capitalisation deflated by total assets.  
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Table 7 Probability of being involved in a PTP based on CEO shareholdings, 
other variables being calculated at their mean values  
 
CEO shareholding (%) 
 
Probability of PTP (%) 
10 
 
2.11 
15 
 
2.73 
20 
 
3.53 
25 
 
4.54 
30 
 
5.83 
35 
 
7.46 
40 
 
9.46 
50 
 
15.07 
60 
 
23.10 
70 33.70 
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Table 8 Logistic regression results of the board, ownership and growth 
opportunity characteristics of public to private firms and firms remaining public 
with shareholding and board structure interaction terms 
 
    
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Q -0.4921 
(2.12)** 
-0.5140 
(2.02)** 
-0.4922 
(2.12)** 
-0.5260 
(2.05)** 
PNX 0.0015 
(0.14) 
-0.0038 
(0.35) 
  
PINDNX   0.0012 
(0.13) 
-0.0065 
(0.72) 
CEOsh 0.0345 
(2.67)*** 
 0.0345 
(2.68)*** 
 
INSTITsh  0.0227 
(2.70)*** 
 0.0233 
(2.75)*** 
CEOsh*Duality  0.0977 
(2.91)*** 
 0.0971 
(2.93)*** 
INSTITsh*Duality 0.0104 
(0.98) 
 0.0104 
(0.98) 
 
FCF -0.0147 
(0.81) 
-0.0112 
(0.63) 
-0.0148 
(0.81) 
-0.0113 
(0.63) 
THREAT2 0.3405 
(0.35) 
0.4689 
(0.50) 
0.3324 
(0.34) 
0.5129 
(0.54) 
Constant 0.0801 
(0.13) 
-0.2310 
(0.37) 
0.1001 
(0.20) 
-0.1669 
(0.33) 
 
2 
 
14.86** 
 
24.47*** 
 
14.86** 
 
24.86*** 
  
t values in parentheses 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10% 
2 tests the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero. 
 
PNX is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. PINDNX is the percentage of 
independent directors on the board. Directors are classified as independent if they are non-
executive directors who have not previously been previously employed either as an executive 
director of the company or had been employed as an advisor to the company. DUALITY is a 
binary variable that takes the value 1 if the same person holds the posts of CEO and chairman, 
and zero if the posts are held by different people. CEOsh is the percentage of ordinary shares 
held by the CEO, or where appropriate, the executive chairman. INSTITsh is the total percentage 
shareholdings of institutions, where the shareholding is in excess of 3%. FCF is a measure of free 
cash flow. It is defined as operating cash flow minus interest, tax and dividends deflated by sales 
and converted to a percentage. THREAT2 is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a company 
had been the subject of hostile take-over speculation in the financial press and zero if it had not. 
Q is the Q ratio and is defined as market capitalisation deflated by total assets.  
 
 
